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Abstract
We develop a model of scarce, renewable resources to study the commons problem.
We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, property rights can often be less eﬃ-
cient than a commons. In particular, we study two eﬀects: (1) waste which arises when
individuals expend resources to use a resource unavailable due to congestion and (2) the
risk of underutilization of the resource. We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for each eﬀect to dominate the other when the cost of determining the availability of a
resource is low.
1 Introduction
Many resources are allocated on a first-come, first serve basis. For example, picnic tables.
This “open” arrangement may result in low value use of tables when high value users are
waiting. The waiting could be eliminated through the use of reservations, commonly used
to allocate the use of other park facilities, such as athletic fields, campsites, and parking
lots. Yet few parks allow individuals to reserve picnic tables, park benches, or childrens’
swings.
Open picnic tables involve the organizational form known as a commons. While reserva-
tions assign property rights of a specified time and table to a picnicker, open picnic tables
do not, opening the resource freely to all. The commons organizational form is generally
considered a tragedy because it lacks a mechanism to prevent overuse of resources, lead-
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ing to ineﬃcient allocation (Hardin, 1968).1 But if so, why is this organizational form so
popular among park administrators? We will show here that in many settings, the open
arrangement is actually more eﬃcient than reservations.2
Scheduling picnic tables in advance will idle resources and may also lead to overuse of the
resources, at least when the reservation is not priced. Moreover, at the time of a reservation,
the value is not known and may change, resulting in a “jumping the gun” ineﬃciency of
the kind detailed by Roth and Xing (1994). Open picnic tables, in contrast, incur higher
waiting costs and may also be ineﬃciently utilized unless an auction is held for the slot.
The important thing to understand is that both advance scheduling and ex post allocation
involve ineﬃciencies, so that the comparison is not at all obvious and in particular the
commons approach may dominate. Either can be more eﬃcient, and this paper provides a
characterization of eﬃciency.
There are many other settings that mirror park facilities with respect to the commons. We
will argue below that the use of unassigned Wi-Fi and cordless phone spectrum is anal-
ogous to open picnic tables. In addition, the relationship between private vehicles and
membership-based vehicle sharing programs, such as zipcar and analogous products for bi-
cycles, is analogous to the advance assignment of property rights or not. Indeed, there are
a variety of settings where the commons is potentially a superior organizational form to the
ex ante assignment of property rights.
We model the distribution of a single good that is costless but available only in a quan-
tity insuﬃcient to meet demand. Scarce natural resources such as wireless spectrum fit
this description. Alternatively, our model describes the case where production is costly
but cannot be conditioned on realized demand, and where undistributed units of the good
lose their value. This would describe, for example, the sale of airline seats, the quantity
of which normally cannot be adjusted in the short run. There is a finite set of individuals
with single-unit demands for the good, drawn from some known distribution. Recipients of
the good pay a fixed price.
1Each individual who arrives imposes a cost on the others (a lower probability of getting a picnic table)
but captures all of the benefits of arriving. The result is that too many picnickers arrive.
2Heller and Eisenberg (1998) also argue that the organizational form of property rights can also lead
to a tragedy because of a transaction cost in ex post transfer. If multiple parties have property rights
over diﬀerent aspects of a single resource, the transaction costs involved in assembling the bundle of rights
necessary to utilize the resource can lead to underuse. We ignore this specific issue by assuming that property
rights are allocated in eﬃciently sized bundles. The transaction cost in our model is the cost of coordinating
which picnickers get to use the picnic tables. We explicitly model this cost through the transportation cost
incurred by picnickers who chose to arrive at the park.
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There are two dates. At time zero, the individuals may call for reservations, if reservations
are allowed. We study both the case where individuals know the realizations of their value
at time zero as well as the case where individuals learn of their valuation at time one. At
time one, the individuals choose whether to arrive at the distribution center, and incur a
transportation cost if they arrive. Holders of reservations are guaranteed a unit of the good,
while those without reservations are randomly selected to receive a unit of the good.
The model contains the following tradeoﬀ: without reservations, some individuals may ar-
rive who are not served, leading to a wasted transportation cost. This waste corresponds
to overuse in the traditional commons model. The risk of not being served, however, keeps
individuals with relatively low demands from arriving, leading to the allocation of the good
to higher value users.
We prove several results applicable when the transportation cost is low. Define the expected
surplus of a distribution as a function which returns, for any price, the expected consumer
surplus conditional on trade at that price. For the case where individuals know the real-
izations of their values at the time that the reservations are made, we show that, if the
good is unpriced, then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for reservations to be optimal is
that the expected surplus is decreasing at zero. Furthermore, if prices are positive, then a
suﬃcient condition for reservations to be optimal is that the expected surplus is decreasing
at the price. If the welfare-maximizing price is chosen in each regime, then reservations are
strictly optimal. For the case where individuals do not know their valuations at time zero,
we show that reservations are never optimal.
This question has widespread applicability in other commons environments. Coase (1959)
argued that property rights should be developed over wireless spectrum. While much of
this spectrum is closed, there are notable exceptions. Radio spectrum for cordless phones,
CB radio, walkie-talkies, and wireless computer connections known as wi-fi (802.11b and g)
are open — any complying use is permitted. Manufacturers just use the spectrum as much
as they want for complying devices. We notice the commons problem when our computers
try to connect to someone else’s insecure wireless access point, or when our phone picks
up a neighbor’s call, but overall the arrangement works well and certainly has led to a
proliferation of devices. It is not plausible that assigning property rights to the spectrum
would produce higher value than the current arrangement in these applications.
In recent years a significant debate has emerged over the regulation of wireless spectrum.
Benkler (1998) and Noam (1998) advocate open spectrum, in part on the grounds that
3
new technologies enable more eﬃcient use of the airwaves so that spectrum is no longer a
scarce good. The latter proposed that, in the event of continuing scarcity at peak moments,
spectrum should remain open but be priced, a call supported by Benkler (2002). With or
without a price, the regime of open spectrum corresponds to the case of open tables.
The proposal for open spectrum was opposed by Hazlett (1998), who argued that spec-
trum is still scarce, and that a regime of open but priced access would impose prohibitive
transaction costs. The argument that continuing scarcity recommends closed spectrum was
seconded by Cave and Webb (2004), among others. The regime of property rights corre-
sponds to the case of reservations.
Early models of the tragedy of the commons were introduced by Gordon (1954) and Scott
(1955) in the context of commercial fisheries and similar industries such as hunting and oil
production. We note that these resources are exhaustible — a fishery that is overexploited
today may not exist tomorrow. In contrast, the resources studied in our model, such as
wireless spectrum and airline seats, are perfectly renewable. Unfilled seats on an airline
flight today can not be used in the future.
The problem studied in our model also emerges in the sale of time-dependent goods and
services, such as rental cars, airline seats, and movie tickets. Ski resorts and amusement
parks commonly assign rides on a first-come first-serve basis through queues, and generally
do not take reservations for rides at specific times. Barro and Romer (1987) showed that
this method is nearly eﬃcient even in times of peak demand. In contrast, art museums,
such as the Getty Villa near Los Angeles, regularly take reservations in periods of high
demand.
2 The model
There is a finite set of n agents and a scarce indivisible good of which m units are available,
n > m > 0. Each agent has a demand for a single unit of this good which is drawn i.i.d.
from a known distribution F with density f and with support contained in [0,∞). Reser-
vations may or may not be scheduled in advance. At the distribution time, agents choose
to arrive (or not) at the distribution point and incur transportation cost c if they arrive.
The m units of the good are then sold to the individuals who arrive at price p, with those
individuals who have reservations being given first priority.
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2.1 Individual values known at the time of the reservation
In the case of “open tables” there are no reservations. Individuals who arrive are not
guaranteed a unit of the good. An individual will choose to arrive if her valuation exceeds
a cutoﬀ v∗ ≥ p+ c. This gives a binomial distribution of the number of others who arrive,
and if i others arrive, the probability of service is min
￿
m
i+1 , 1
￿
. Thus the probability of
service is
αo ≡
n−1￿
i=0
￿
n− 1
i
￿
(1− F (v∗))i F (v∗)n−1−imin
￿
m
i+ 1
, 1
￿
.
The value v∗ is defined by the equation c = (v∗ − p)αo as this sets the expected gain equal to
the cost for the marginal person. The probability that i people arrive is
￿n
i
￿
(1− F (v∗))i F (v∗)n−i.
At most m units of the good can be distributed, thus the expected number of individuals
who are served is given by
κ(v∗) ≡
n￿
i=0
￿
n
i
￿
(1− F (v∗))i F (v∗)n−imin {m, i} .
The expected value of the good to an individual who arrives is
E [v|v ≥ v∗] =
￿ ∞
v∗
xf(x)
1− F (v∗)dx.
The total social welfare is the expected number of people who are served, times their
expected values, minus the expected number of people who arrive, n (1− F (v∗)), times
their transportation cost c, or:
Wo(c) = κ(v
∗)E [v|v ≥ v∗]− n (1− F (v∗)) c.
In the case of “reservations,” individuals are allocated rights to use the tables in advance.
Individuals know their valuations at the time of making the reservation. Calling for a
reservation is assumed to be costless, so all individuals whose valuations exceed p + c will
call for a reservation. The firstm callers will be awarded reservations and will be guaranteed
a unit of the good. The total social welfare is the expected number of people who arrive
times their expected values less their transportation cost, or
Wr(c) = κ(p+ c) (E [v|v ≥ p+ c]− c) .
Note that if the transportation cost c is zero, then v∗ = p, and thus social welfare is the
same under both reservations and open tables, that is, Wr(0) =Wo(0).
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Define individual’s expected surplus is the amount by which the individual’s expected value
exceeds an amount x, conditional on the value being higher than x, or
Γ(x) = E[v|v ≥ x]− x.
We derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for when the transportation cost c is small
and the good is unpriced. In this case, open tables dominate reservations if and only if the
expected surplus is increasing at zero; that is, if Γ￿(0) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2.1. For suﬃciently small c, if the good is unpriced, Wo(c) ≥Wr(c) if and only
if f(0)
￿ ∞
0
xf(x)dx ≥ 1, or equivalently, Γ￿(0) ≥ 0.
For the uniform distribution, reservations dominates open tables. For the exponential dis-
tribution with a zero base, the expected surplus is constant, and thus this is a transition
case. Finally, if F (x) = xa, for a < 1, open tables dominates reservations for suﬃciently
small costs c. Roughly speaking, open tables dominate reservations if the frequency of low
values is very high, more than one over the mean.
Many theoretical studies assume that hazard rates are non-decreasing or, equivalently, that
the probability distribution is log-concave. This condition is suﬃcient to imply that the
expected surplus is non-increasing.3 In such a case, reservations dominates open tables for
any price, not just the zero price contemplated in Theorem 2.1, as we now show.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that the price p > 0 and that Γ￿(p) ≤ 0. For suﬃciently small c,
Wr(c) > Wo(c).
2.2 Varying prices
Up until this part of the paper, we have assumed that the price p is the same for both open
tables and reservations. Alternatively, one might allow these prices to vary. Formally, let po
be the price chosen under open tables, with Wo(c, po) denoting the resulting social welfare,
and let pr be the price chosen under reservations, with Wr(c, pr) denoting social welfare
under reservations. If prices are chosen to maximize social welfare, and the transportation
cost is low, then reservations strictly dominates open tables. The proof is left for readers.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that the price po = argmaxpWo(c, p), and that the price pr =
argmaxpWr(c, p). For suﬃciently small c, Wr(c, po) > Wo(c, pr).
3For more on the relationship between these assumptions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). They refer
to the expected surplus as the Mean Residual Lifetime Function.
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Alternatively, the price might be set by a profit-maximizing firm, such as a restaurant. In
this case, reservations often dominate, but not always. As in the case of Theorem 2.2, a
suﬃcient condition for reservations to dominate open tables is that the expected surplus be
decreasing at the price. If open tables dominates, then the price set by the firm is below
the socially optimal price. At profit maximizing price, reservations are always optimal for
firm.
2.3 Individual valuations unknown at the time of the reservation
In some settings, it may be more realistic to assume that agents do not know their valuations
at the time that the reservation is made. In this case, all agents call for reservations which
are awarded to the first m callers. Agents with reservations arrive to purchase the unit of
the good if their valuations exceed p+ c. Agents without reservations may choose to arrive
hoping to purchase one of the expected mF (p+ c) units remaining. These individuals will
arrive if they have suﬃciently high valuations, exceeding a value vˆ ≥ p + c, and will be
served with probability
αs ≡
m￿
i=0
￿
m
i
￿
(1− F (p+ c))i F (p+ c)m−i
n−m−1￿
j=0
￿
n−m− 1
j
￿
(1− F (vˆ))j F (vˆ)n−m−1−j min
￿
m− i
j + 1
, 1
￿
,
where vˆ is defined by the equation c = (vˆ − p)αs. The formulation of αs can be seen as
follows. There are m people with reservations, but only the number i with a value exceed-
ing p+ c appear, leaving m− i available slots. Those people without reservations but with
values exceeding vˆ risk standing in line to get served, and this is also binomially generated.
The total number of individuals without reservations who are served is given by
λ(vˆ, p+ c) ≡
m￿
i=0
￿
m
i
￿
(1− F (p+ c))i F (p+ c)m−i
n−m￿
j=0
￿
n−m
j
￿
(1− F (vˆ))j F (vˆ)n−m−j min {m− i, j} .
Total social welfare is given by:
Ws(c) = m (1− F (p+ c)) (E [v|v ≥ p+ c]− c) +λ(vˆ, p+c)E [v|v ≥ vˆ]−(n−m) (1− F (vˆ)) c.
In this case it is less obvious, but equally true, that when the transportation cost c is zero,
social welfare is the same under both reservations and open tables.
Lemma 2.4. Wo(0) =Ws(0).
When the agents do not know their valuations in advance, and the transportation cost c is
suﬃciently small, more individuals are served under the policy of open tables than under
reservations.
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Lemma 2.5. For suﬃciently small c, κ(v∗) ≥ m(1− F (p+ c)) + λ(vˆ, p+ c).
Furthermore, if sup{p|F (p+ c) < 1} > p > 0, then κ(v∗) > m(1− F (p+ c)) + λ(vˆ, p+ c).
This implies that if individuals do not know their values in advance, a profit-maximizing
firm will prefer open tables to a policy of reservations.
When the agents do not know their valuations in advance, and the transportation cost c
is suﬃciently small, open tables dominates reservations regardless of the price chosen and
regardless of the distribution of the valuations. If prices are strictly positive, a policy of
open tables strictly dominates a policy of reservations. This theorem does not depend on
the assumption that the expected surplus is non-increasing.
Theorem 2.6. For suﬃciently small c, Wo(c) ≥Ws(c) for every distribution F .
Furthermore, if sup{p|F (p+ c) < 1} > p > 0, then Wo(c) > Ws(c).
3 Conclusion
Should the Federal Communications Commission open some spectrum to all firms, pro-
viding unlicensed bands as it did with wi-fi spectrum? Traditional property-rights based
analysis suggests not, and several authors have echoed this view. We study this problem
through an analogous model of picnic table allocation and show that, while interference
is possible, unlicensed bands may lead to more intensive use of the spectrum than would
arise under licensing. We prove several results about the optimality of reservations when
transportation costs are low.
First, if values are known at the time that reservations are made and the item is un-
priced, then reservations are optimal if and only if the expected surplus is decreasing at
zero. Roughly speaking, providing unlicensed spectrum is advantageous over licensing when
there is a large chance of very low value use. For low power, low interference devices like
Wi-Fi routers, this seems quite plausible, while for higher power, high interference devices
like cellular phones, licensing seems optimal.
Second, if values are known and the item is priced, then reservations dominates if the ex-
pected surplus is decreasing at the price. Third, if values are not known at the time that
reservations are made, then reservations are never optimal. This last result is true even
though the distribution of values is known at the time reservations are made.
Lessig (2001) argued that unlicensed bands lead to higher rates of growth in telecommu-
nications technology. While we can neither confirm nor reject this hypothesis, our model
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does suggest the existence of a relationship between the commons and innovation. A high
rate of change in the use of the resource will make it harder for individuals to predict their
future values. As a result, our last theorem suggests that unlicensed bands are preferable
in the presence of innovation. It is not clear whether innovations in telecommunications
hardware occur at a fast enough rate to aﬀect values in the manner described in the paper.
However, we note that such changes need not involve physical technology — innovations in
software and by websites may also aﬀect individuals’ values.
Our theory might also be applied to the distribution of influenza vaccines. Demand for
these vaccines varies widely across members of the population according to their ages,
health conditions, employment status, and general aversion to being sick. Because indi-
viduals generally know their values far in advance, our theory suggests that reservations
are likely to be optimal. While the open regime is more common when excess vaccines
are available, a combination of reservations (in the form of doctors appointments) and pri-
ority rationing (to the elderly) is commonly used to allocate the vaccines in times of scarcity.
We have assumed that the population of students is finite. This assumption implies that
the number of students who choose to arrive is a random variable. If we were to model
students with a non-atomic measure space, the number who arrive would be deterministic,
and the main eﬀect of the model would vanish, as there would never be underuse of the
resource. Alternatively, one might assume that the number of students is itself stochastic.
We would not expect the results to diﬀer significantly in this case.
There are, of course, many potential mechanisms which can be used to allocate scarce
resources. We focus on open tables and reservations because they correspond to the property
rights and commons regimes, respectively. In other contexts, a natural mechanism to study
would be the queuing problem, in which individuals line up, and are served in the order
in which they arrive. Open tables is a special case of this mechanism. The more general
problem with discounting is worth studying in future work.
Appendices
A Proof of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
First, we note that when the transportation cost c is zero, the open tables and reser-
vations models are equivalent; that is, Wo(0) = Wr(0). It follows that for suﬃciently
small transportation costs c, open tables dominates reservations (Wo(c) ≥ Wr(c)) when
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W ￿o(0) ≥W ￿r(0). By computing these derivatives we find that W ￿o(0) ≥W ￿r(0) if and only if
κ(p)
f(p)
1− F (p) (E [v|v ≥ p]− p) ≥ κ(p)− κ
￿(p)E [v|v ≥ p] . (1)
After dividing by κ(p) and evaluating at p = 0, statement (1) reduces to f(0)
￿∞
0 xf(x)dx ≥
1, or that the expected surplus is increasing at zero. This proves Theorem 2.1.
Next, assume that price p is strictly positive and that the expected surplus is non-increasing
in the price, or Γ￿(p) ≤ 0. Together these assumptions imply that:
κ(p)
f(p)
1− F (p) (E [v|v ≥ p]− p) < κ(p)− κ
￿(p)E [v|v ≥ p] ,
and therefore that W ￿o(0) < W ￿r(0). This proves Theorem 2.2.
B Proof of Lemma 2.4.
If the transportation cost c is zero, then vˆ = p, and thus Ws(0) = m (1− F (p))E[v|v ≥
p] + λ(p, p)E[v|v ≥ p]. Because m (1− F (p)) + λ(p, p) = κ(p), it follows that Ws(0) =
κ(p)E[v|v ≥ p] =Wo(0).
C Proof of Lemma 2.5.
Let O(c) = κ(v∗) be the number served with open tables, and let S(c) = m(1 − F (p +
c)) + λ(vˆ, p + c) be the number served with reservations when individuals do not know
their values at time zero. Then O(0) = κ(p) and S(0) = m(1 − F (p)) + λ(p, p) = κ(p).
It follows that for suﬃciently small transportation costs c, more are served with open
tables than with reservations when O￿(0) ≥ S￿(0), and strictly more are served with open
tables than with reservations when O￿(0) > S￿(0). Computing these derivatives, we find
that O￿(0) = n(1−F (p))κ
￿(p)
κ(p) , and S
￿(0) = ddcλ {vˆ, p+ c}
￿￿
c=0
−mf(p). Comparison of these
terms shows that the former (O￿(0)) is larger than the latter (S￿(0)) for all prices and all
distributions, and is strictly larger when p is positive. This proves the lemma.
D Proof of Theorem 2.6.
By Lemma 2.4, when the transportation cost c is zero, the open tables and reservations
models are equivalent; that is, Wo(0) = Ws(0). It follows that for suﬃciently small
transportation costs c, open tables weakly dominates reservations (Wo(c) ≥ Ws(c)) when
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W ￿o(0) ≥W ￿s(0), and that open tables strictly dominates reservations (Wo(c) > Ws(c)) when
W ￿o(0) > W ￿s(0). By computing these derivatives we find that W ￿o(0) ≥W ￿r(0) if and only if
n (1− F (p))κ￿(p)
κ(p)
≥ d
dc
λ {vˆ, p+ c}
￿￿￿￿
c=0
−mf(p). (2)
This is the statement that O￿(0) ≥ S￿(0) (see the proof of Lemma 2.5), and therefore, by
Lemma 2.5, W ￿o(0) ≥W ￿s(0) for every distribution F . Furthermore, if the price p is strictly
positive, then W ￿o(0) > W ￿s(0). This proves Theorem 2.6.
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